ABSTRACT: Groups of countries in a region sometimes impose environmental regulations on themselves, particularly inside the European Union. Regional environmental regulations might affect trade flows to and from the regulated countries differently than unilaterally generated regulations for two reasons. The first we term the uneven competitiveness effect: A given increase in production costs across all countries is a higher percentage increase in production costs for countries that produce low-cost goods than for those that produce high-cost goods. The second reason we term the uneven burden of compliance: Because high-income countries are more likely than low income countries to have relatively stringent environmental regulations in place prior to the creation of regional environmental regulations, the cost of compliance with a given regional environmental regulation might be lower for high income countries than for lowincome countries.
Introduction
Groups of countries sometimes impose regulations on themselves. The nature of these regulations ranges from military policy, such as nuclear proliferation restrictions, to trade policy, such as limitations on tariffs due to World Trade Organization membership.
One specific form of group regulation is regional environmental regulation: A group of countries in a region imposes environmental regulations on all members of the group.
Regional environmental regulation has occurred inside common markets, such as the European Union, and other economic integration agreements (EIAs), such as the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation treaty that was designed to accompany the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 3, 4 In this paper, we
show that the consequences of increasing environmental regulation stringency differs across low-income and high-income member countries of the European Union. We model and demonstrate empirically the possibility for high-income members of a region to benefit from environmental regulations imposed on the entire group as a protectionist measure-that is, as a means of deterring industry from relocating to the lower-income countries to take advantage of the lower production costs offered there and of simultaneously increasing sales of exports of domestic producers.
This paper exploits survey data from the World Economic Forum in which business executives rate environmental regulation stringency in various countries. Using these data in a gravity equation context, we test the effect of an increase in environmental regulation stringency on bilateral trade flows from all countries (in the dataset) to all 3 The EU has passed, beginning in 1980, a series of specific directives with stated limits on, for example, sulfur dioxide concentrations in ambient air. 4 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation does not create new environmental standards or limits on pollutions. Rather, it is designed to encourage enforcement of existing environmental standards within NAFTA member countries.
countries, from high-income countries to high-income countries, from high-income countries to low-income countries, from low-income countries to high-income countries, from low-income countries to low-income countries, and from low-income countries to all countries. We control for whether an increase in environmental regulation stringency occurred within a European Union member country, allowing estimation of the effects of environmental regulation inside and outside a region.
Background
Many economists have investigated the relation between international trade flows and environmental regulations. Some research on this subject has tested whether a country can increase its ability to export by reducing the stringency of environmental regulations and therefore lowering the costs of production for exporters (Ederington and Minier, 2003; Levinson and Taylor, 2004; Ederington et al., 2005) . Also, the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) states that "dirty" industries will relocate to those countries that lower their environmental standards, further increasing those countries' exports (Mani and Wheeler, 1999; Levinson and Taylor, 2004) . The combination of lowered costs for domestic exporters and the relocation of dirty industries from countries with stringent environmental regulations to pollution havens theoretically leads to predictions of increased exports when a country lowers its environmental regulation stringency.
Empirically, however, the effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency have not been clear. Those studies that have found support for the PHH have generally been limited to studies of the United States and some of its trade partners or studies of only European countries.
For over forty years, international-trade economists have empirically tested the effects of changes in determinants of trade patterns by using the gravity equation, explained further in section 4 of this paper. Until recently, most gravity equation estimates had not found empirical evidence to support that a decrease in environmental regulation stringency leads to an increase in exports (Harris et al., 2002) . Furthermore, early gravity equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows rely on proxies for environmental regulation stringency that likely introduced endogeneity to the estimates (Jug and Mirza, 2005) . In appendix A, we explicitly show how environmental outcome variables introduce endogeneity into gravity equation
estimates of the effects of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows. In addition, we introduce a new proxy for environmental regulation stringency-survey data -and show that it might not introduce endogeneity in appendix B.
More recent gravity equation estimates that appropriately accounted for unobservable country characteristics that could affect both the choice of environmental regulation stringency and the level of economic activity has found statistically significant, positive effect of lowering environmental regulation stringency on exports (Jug and Mirza, 2005) . Jug and Mirza run instrumental variables estimations of gravity equation
estimates of the effect of environmental regulation compliance expenditure and obtain results that are similar to a non-gravity equation study (Ederington and Minier, 2003 ) that had been conducted using U.S. data. Both studies' results obtain a significant positive effect on exports when environmental regulation stringency is relaxed. We improve on these studies in multiple ways. The first is by using a proxy for environmental regulation stringency-survey data from the World Economic Forum-that is less likely to introduce endogeneity. Using this proxy also allows us to include many more nonEuropean and low-income countries in our dataset than most previous studies. The second is by using gravity equation estimation techniques developed by Baier and
Bergstrand that allow the inclusion of an economic integration agreement variable in the gravity equation without biasing estimates (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . The third is by controlling for the possible interaction between European Union membership and environmental regulations. Regulations imposed by the EU on the entire group might have different effects than unilaterally generated regulations. Finally, we estimate the effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency on trade flows for countries of different income levels, because the effects may drastically differ for high-income countries and low-income countries.
Unilateral versus Regional Environmental Regulations
When an increase in environmental regulation stringency occurs unilaterally due to changes within the country (e.g. pressure from constituents for a cleaner environment), the effect on exports from that country to other countries could be positive or negative.
Technology spillovers, other countries' taste for "green" goods, establishment and protection of property rights, and signaling of governmental stability could all contribute to a positive effect on exports from a country due to a unilateral increase in environmental regulations in the low-income country. Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argue that stringent environmental regulations can benefit a country not only through improved environmental quality but also through the development of comparative advantages in highly regulated industries.
Conversely, the increased cost of production due to the increase in regulations could contribute to a negative effect on exports because of the resultant higher price of domestically produced goods relative to foreign goods. This could be exacerbated if some "dirty" industries choose to relocate because of the increased cost of production.
The net effect of a unilateral increase in environmental regulation stringency therefore seems to be an empirical question.
When an increase in environmental regulation stringency occurs due to changes beyond an individual country's control (e.g. the European Union imposes environmental standards on all members), it is possible that any possible positive effect on exports from that country due to the change would be diminished while the negative effect would be simultaneously magnified. Any positive effect resulting from establishment and protection of property rights and signaling of governmental stability might disappear because the regulations are not self-imposed; externally generated regulations do not necessarily signal stability or protection of property rights: People do not believe that a power-hungry dictator has truly eschewed the development of nuclear weapons when threats of UN sanctions and even war have forced the dictator to stop nuclear weapon development in his country. The cost of production might increase even more than in the case of self-imposed regulations if generalized environmental standards applied across a group of countries ignore differences in individual country characteristics, such as variance in the sulfur content of coal and oil across countries; these characteristics are less likely to be ignored by policymakers in each individual country, and the lowest-cost type of regulation (that achieves the same outcome standard) could be chosen on a tailored basis in the case of a unilateral environmental regulation increase (Oates and Schwab, 1996) .
One largely unexplored area in the empirical international trade literature is the interaction of economic integration agreements (EIAs), such as the European Union and NAFTA, and environmental regulations. We show, in a model in section 3 and empirically in section 5, that the (possibly unintended) consequences of regional environmental regulations that could differ across income levels of countries. Lowincome countries in an EIA could be more adversely affected by an increase in production costs caused by environmental regulations than high-income countries for two possible reasons. The first we term the uneven competitiveness effect, and it is a reframing of the Alchian-Allen hypothesis (Alchian and Allen, 1964) . The second reason we term the uneven burden of compliance: Because high-income countries are more likely than low-income countries to have relatively stringent environmental regulations in place prior to the creation of regional environmental regulations, the cost of compliance with a given regional environmental regulation might be lower for high-income countries than for low-income countries. The remainder of section 2 briefly explains these two effects.
Uneven Competitiveness Effect
The Alchian-Allen hypothesis is that the presence of a per-unit transport cost lowers the relative price of high-quality goods compared to low-quality goods. For example, transportation costs cause firms to export high-quality apples while keeping low-quality apples for domestic consumption, a phenomenon that Alchian and Allen refer to as "shipping the good apples out." We reframe the Alchian-Allen hypothesis to examine an increase in production cost due to an increase in environmental regulation stringency. This is explained briefly here and shown more explicitly in a model in section 3.
If production costs in all countries in a region increase by some constant k as a result of regional environmental regulations, the percent increase in price will be higher for countries that produce low-priced goods than countries that produce high-priced goods. If there are other producers outside the region whose costs are not increased by k, then the impact on each country's competitiveness (relative to the rest of the world)
caused by the increase in price falls more heavily on the low-income countries inside the group than the high-income countries. 5 In other words, there is an uneven effect on country competitiveness across income groups.
Uneven Burden of Compliance
The second reason that low-income countries could be more adversely affected than high-income countries due to an increase in regional environmental regulation stringency is that the costs of compliance with the regulation may not be equally distributed among all countries. High-income countries typically have more stringent environmental regulations in place than low income countries prior to the passage of any regional environmental regulations. 6 Compliance with regional environmental regulations would be less costly in those high-income countries than in low-income countries, if all countries have to meet some constant standard of compliance. Thus, the increase in production costs would be higher in low-income countries than in highincome countries: the uneven burden of compliance. The uneven burden of compliance is modeled in section 3.
Model

Consumption
Each of N different countries produces a single product, whose exogenous quality is differentiated from the products of other countries. 7 The representative consumer in country j maximizes his CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility function:
Subject to a budget constraint:
Where M j is country j's income (real GDP), p ij is the price of country i's good when it is sold in country j, x ij is the quantity of good produced in country i that gets consumed in country j, μ i is the quality of country i's good, and ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a preference parameter capturing the substitutability between goods: As ρ approaches 1, the goods are nearly perfect substitutes, and as ρ approaches 0, the goods are more complimentary. The FOC of this constrained optimization's LaGrangian is given by: Instead of a single product, it could be that each country produces a variety of products. This variety could even be endogenized, following Dixit-Stiglitz, but that complication seems unnecessary here. Dividing the FOC for good i by that of good 1 yields:
Solving for x ij :
Let σ denote the elasticity of substitution, i.e. σ = 1 / (1 -ρ) and 1 < σ < ∞:
Multiplying both sides by p ij and summing over i to produce country j's income on the LHS, we find:
Solving this expression for x ij yields:
The denominator of this demand is a quality-adjusted price index for country j, which we will refer to as I j . This Marshallian Demand immediately implies the total expenditure of those in country j on the goods from country i is given by:
Because of transport costs and tariffs, the price of an imported good is more expensive than the same good in its home country. We model this accordingly:
Where p i is the price of the good in its home country, D ij is the distance between country i and country j, and 1{EIA} equals 1 iff i and j are members of an EIA (Economic Integration Agreement). We assume that a good's quality is increasing in the GDP of the country where it is produced:
Substituting these two expressions into the expenditure shares produces the gravity equation, where κ and α are simply parameters:
Production
The representative producer in each country is a monopolistically competitive firm with a constant marginal cost that varies across countries, c i . We assume c i is increasing in μ. The producer's objective is to maximize profits:
We assume that the country is a price index taker. The FOC governs the country's optimal pricing policy:
Making the optimal price a simple mark-up over marginal cost:
This yields a simple expression for the country's income:
Effects of Environmental Regulatory Compliance
We investigate the possible effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency by examining comparative statics in a partial equilibrium-one without income effects-and then discuss the potential role of those income effects.
We model environmental regulation as an exogenous change that benefits the representative consumer's utility at the expense of higher marginal cost in production.
The benefits are assumed to be accrued in a linearly separable portion of the utility function, which implies that only the costs (and not the benefits) alter the behavior of agents in our existing model. Substituting (3.4) into (3.1), we reach a reduced form Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) for consumers in country j considering imports from country i and country k. To examine the substitution effect of environmental regulations, consider the reduced MRS both before and after an increase in environmental regulation stringency (t=0 and t=1, respectively):
Where r is the increase in marginal cost due to regulation, t is both a superscript and dummy variable indicating pre-and post-regulation periods, and two different countries selling goods in country j are indexed by i and k. We compare the pre-and postregulation MRS to find the condition under which the MRS has decreased as a result of the environmental regulations:
Performing some basic algebra yields
which holds when c i > c k and r k ≥ r i . When the marginal cost of production is higher in country i than in country k, or when the cost of compliance is greater in country k than in country i, the effect of an increase in regional environmental regulation stringency is to decrease the MRS. The aforementioned Alchian-Allen hypothesis is a special case of this condition, where the costs of compliance are equal for both countries: r k = r i .
There is good reason to suspect that this condition holds for the EU. High-income member nations typically produce more expensive (and higher quality) products than low-income member nations and most nations seeking to join (e.g., financial services produced in London versus textiles in Turkey, a candidate state). Likewise, the highincome member nations on average have stricter environmental regulations than lowincome member nations and most nations seeking to join. Consequentially, we would expect that regulatory cost of low-income members or candidate members would be greater than high-income member nations. If this condition does indeed hold, then:
Hence, ex post exports from country k to country j are smaller than ex ante, relative to the exports of country i. The partial equilibrium effect of the regulation is to cause consumers to substitute away from less-costly goods to more-expensive goods because the costs of the regulation somewhat equilibrates the marginal costs of those goods.
The partial equilibrium results indicate that richer countries grab a larger market share when environmental regulations are increased. However, this can be (somewhat)
counteracted by a general equilibrium effect: The size of the overall market is decreased by the income effect of the environmental regulation. In contrast, expanding an EIA lowers tariffs, producing a wealth effect in the opposite direction. Hence, if an increase in environmental regulations is accompanied by a sufficient expansion in EIAs, then the market can grow and rich countries can increase their market share. Thus, the presumed exogeneity of environmental regulations is drawn into question because the unintended consequences of that regulation may disproportionally benefit particular agents.
Following Maloney and McCormick (1982) , we could model firms in country i lobbying for environmental regulations because their profits vary with environmental regulation. If regulations were determined by a vote of industry representatives, then the median-cost country could effectively choose its first-best alternative. The situation is more interesting when environmental regulations, once passed, are irreversible (i.e.
environmental regulations can only be tightened, not slackened). In this case, existing EU members could extract (nearly) all of the gains from integration simply by increasing environmental regulations up to a participation constraint for countries seeking membership. This particular idea is left for future research.
Econometric Issues with the Gravity Equation
The literature on the effects of environmental regulations on trade flows has suffered from the lack of a standard measure of environmental regulation stringency.
Previous gravity equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows have relied on outcome measures, such as energy intensity, carbon emissions, and sulfur emissions; as these studies admit, endogeneity is an issue when using these outcome variables as proxies for environmental regulation stringency. We explicitly show the potential endogeneity of such an outcome variable in appendix A.
Instead of an outcome variable, we use the results of the World Economic
Forum's Global Competitiveness Report survey, which asks thousands of executives from around the world to rate each country's environmental regulation stringency (Porter et al., 2000 (Porter et al., -2005 . This survey asks executives to rate overall environmental regulation stringency in each country, compared to all other countries. The rating scale is from 1 to 7, where 1 is "lax compared with most other countries" and 7 is "among the world's most stringent." We show in appendix B that endogeneity is possibly avoided by using survey data as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency.
As the topic of regional environmental regulation necessarily requires a regional agreement that imposes the regulation on a group of countries, we first discuss the pitfalls of including an economic integration agreement (EIA) variable in the gravity equation.
Specifically, we address the endogeneity inherent in the selection into EIAs and how other authors have dealt with that problem. 
Endogeneity in the gravity equation
Early versions of the gravity equation applied to international trade flows did not have formal theoretical foundations (for examples, see Tinbergen (1962 ), Linnemann (1966 , Aitken (1973) and Sapir (1981) ); instead, these earlier studies relied either on informal economic foundations or to a physical science analogy. Since 1979, however, formal theoretical economic foundations for a gravity equation similar to equation 1 have surfaced, such as Anderson (1979 ), Bergstrand (1985 , Deardorff (1998) , Baier and Bergstrand (2001) , Eaton and Kortum (2002) , and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) .
All of these models include an explicit role for prices across countries in order to generate unbiased estimates. Anderson and van Wincoop specifically include multilateral (price) resistance terms for each country in their system of equations, and solve their system using a custom nonlinear least squares program. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004, Ch. 5) both suggest using country-specific fixed effects as an alternative method for accounting for multilateral price terms that will also generate unbiased coefficient estimates.
Extending this literature are Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) . Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
Endogeneity in the Economic Integration Agreement variable
An endogeniety bias arises when RHS variables are correlated with the error term.
In equation (4.2), the economic integration agreement (EIA) variable, E ijt , could potentially be correlated with the error term, rendering estimates of the effect of EIAs therefore biased; empirically and theoretically, the determinants of whether a bilateral pair chooses to join an EIA tend to be the same factors that explain large trade flows: size and similarities of countries' GDPs, distance between the two countries and distance to the rest of the world, whether they share a common language, and differences in relative factor endowments with respect to each other and the rest of the world (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) . The error term could capture unobservable policy-related barriers, such as intra-country shipping regulations, in one or both countries that affect trade between the two and are not accounted for in a typical gravity model. Joining an EIA might entail not just the liberalization of tariffs barriers and other border costs but also that of internal, unobservable non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, it seems likely that country pairs that have already harmonized many non-tariff barriers could easily choose to adopt an EIA because the costs of implementing it are relatively low. Failure to econometrically account for this would introduce an underestimation of the effect of joining an EIA due to a selection bias (Baier and Bergstrand, 2006 
Avoiding endogeneity with survey data
To avoid endogeneity, we use survey data rating environmental regulation stringency. In this survey, thousands of business executives are asked to rate countries' environmental-regulation stringency levels, relative to all other countries, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates that a country has lax standards compared to others and 7
indicates that a country has very strict standards compared to others. We use the mean response of the executives' ratings of each country each year as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency. The model of an ordinal signal on a latent variable presented in appendix B shows that utilization of this survey variable might avoid the endogeneity issue that outcome variables introduce.
Interaction of European Union membership and regulations
In addition to using a new proxy to test the effects of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows, we also test whether there is any interaction between membership in the European Union and environmental regulations affecting trade flows.
Previous studies have sometimes controlled for economic-integration agreements (EIAs) (see Harris, Konya, and Matyas (2002) 
Results
The export flows are analyzed in six different patterns: all countries to all countries, high-income countries to high-income countries, high-income countries to low -income countries, low-income countries to high-income countries, low-income countries to low-income countries, and low-income to all countries. The primary hypothesis tested is that exports from a low-income country will be more negatively affected by an increase in environmental regulation stringency if that country is a member of the EU than if that country were not an EU member. This hypothesis will be supported if coefficient on the ENVREG* EU interaction term is negative and significant in the low income to all countries regression. A secondary hypothesis being tested is that a high-income country experiences a greater increase in its exports due to an increase in environmental-regulation stringency if it is in the EU; this is consistent with the idea that EU-wide regulations affect low income EU members' competitiveness more, relative to high income EU members' competitiveness.
ENVREGS it ranges from a possible minimum of 1 to a possible maximum of 7, where 7 indicates that country i has very stringent environmental regulations, compared to other countries, and 1 indicates that country i has very lax environmental regulations, compared to other countries. Thus, a positive coefficient on ENVREGS it would indicate that a unilateral increase in environmental regulation stringency in country i results in an overall increase in exports from that country its trading partners, ceteris paribus. This could result from technology spillovers, consumer demand for "green" goods in trading partner countries, or signaling of regime stability and property right development. It could also indicate that ENVREGS it proxies for some other factor that affects trade. A negative coefficient on ENVREGS it would indicate that exports from country i decrease as a result of an increase in environmental regulation stringency in country i, indicating that the increased production costs made firms in country i less competitive.
The interaction term, ENVREGS it *EU ijt , estimates the effect of an increase in environmental regulation stringency of the exporter, i, given that country i is in the EU.
Its coefficient, β 6 , when added to the coefficient on ENVREGS it , β 4 , estimates the net effect on exports of an increase in environmental regulation stringency in European Union member countries. for all bilateral pairs (all-all), column 2 shows estimates for high-income countries exporting to high-income countries (high-high), column 3 shows high-income to lowincome country pairs (high-low), column 4 shows low-income to high-income country pairs (low-high), column 5 shows low income to low-income country pairs (low-low), and column 6 shows pairs of low-income countries exporting to both high-and lowincome countries (low-all).
In to increase by nearly 10 percent.
The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that high-income EU member countries are made relatively more competitive vis-à-vis low-income countries due to an increase in environmental regulation stringency. In table 6, columns 2 and 3 give the joint effect of an increase in environmental regulation stringency on exports from highincome countries to other country groupings. From column 2, the effect of a one-point increase in environmental regulation stringency on exports from high-income countries in the EU to all high-income countries is an increase of about 8.7 percent, statistically significant at the 10 percent level (p-value of 0.0645). Column 3 shows that when environmental regulation stringency increases by one point, exports from high-income countries in the EU to all low income countries increase by about 10.18 percent, although this estimate is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.1083). Exports from highincome non-EU countries to other high income countries also increase, although the increase is slightly larger at about 13 percent, when environmental regulation stringency increases by one point and exports from high-income non-EU countries to low-income countries are not statistically affected. High-income countries in general seem to increase their competitiveness compared to low-income countries by increasing regulatory stringency.
The joint effect estimates presented in table 6 suggest that an EU-level regulation that increases environmental regulation stringency for all EU members could have an enormous impact on exports flowing from those countries. In particular, low-income EU countries' exports might decrease as a result while high-income EU countries actually might experience an increase in exports.
Conclusion
Changes in environmental regulation stringency in a country theoretically and empirically have different effects on bilateral trade flows depending on whether the country is part of the European Union and on whether the country is a high income or low income country. High-income countries inside an economic integration agreement, such as the European Union, might have incentive to impose environmental regulations on the entire group of countries in the agreement. Regardless of whether the profit incentive actually exists or whether regulations are imposed on the entire EU, the consequences of an increase in environmental regulation stringency differ dramatically for high-income countries in the EU compared to low-income countries.
An increase in environmental regulation stringency in the exporting country generally increases exports from high-income EU member countries to all high-income countries, although the difference between the estimate for high-income EU members and high income non-EU members is negligible. Exports from high-income EU members to all low-income countries increases significantly when environmental regulation stringency is increased in the exporting country, while exports from high-income non-EU members does not change significantly due to a similar change.
Conversely, an increase in environmental regulation stringency unequivocally decreases exports from low-income countries in the EU. A similar change in stringency has either no significant effect on low-income non-EU countries or possibly even a positive effect. We conclude that a European Union decree of increased environmental regulation stringency for all countries could have a negative impact on exporting industries in low-income EU countries while the impact on high-income countries is possibly positive.
Regional trade blocs have grown rapidly in the last two decades; furthermore, these trade blocs are no longer simple "free-trade agreements" but now also include other economic integration objectives like harmonization of competition law policy and monetary policy. This research shows that the interaction effects of regional trade blocs and regulations should not be ignored. Additionally, this paper indicates a possible political economy story behind the proliferation of the regionalization of regulations in general and of environmental regulations specifically. The possible political economy of the regionalization of regulations offers many topics for future research, as does the investigation of its empirical effects on different groups in the region. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Note: Regressions of the natural log of real exports in years 2000 -2005 from exporting country, i, to importing country, j, on the natural log of real GDPs of both countries, the level of each countries' environmental stringency rating, an EU dummy (EU) equal to one if both the exporter and importer were in the EU in year t, and the exporter's environmental stringency rating interacted with a dummy indicating whether the exporter was in the EU in year t (EU*envregs_exp). Dummy variables for years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 are included in each regression (estimates not reported here; available upon request). Fixed-effects for each bilateral pair are included in each regression.
Column 1 includes all country pairs in the dataset; column 2 includes only pairs where both exporter and importer are considered "high income;" column 3 includes only pairs where the exporter is "high income" and the importer is "low income;" column 4 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" and the importer is "high income;" column 5 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" and the importer is "low income;" and column 6 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" paired with all countries in the dataset. Note: Regressions of the natural log of real exports minus log of real GDP of exporter and importer (restricting their coefficients to unity) in years 2000 -2005 from exporting country, i, to importing country, j, on the natural log of real GDPs of both countries, the level of each countries' environmental stringency rating, an EU dummy (EU) equal to one if both the exporter and importer were in the EU in year t, and the exporter's environmental stringency rating interacted with a dummy indicating whether the exporter was in the EU in year t (EU*envregs_exp). Dummy variables for years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 are included in each regression (estimates not reported here; available upon request). Fixed-effects for each bilateral pair are included in each regression.
Column 1 includes all country pairs in the dataset; column 2 includes only pairs where both exporter and importer are considered "high income;" column 3 includes only pairs where the exporter is "high income" and the importer is "low income;" column 4 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" and the importer is "high income;" column 5 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" and the importer is "low income;" and column 6 includes only pairs where the exporter is "low income" paired with all countries in the dataset. Because O it determines Q it , the correlation between O it and Q it is non-zero, implying that
Thus, any outcome measure that depends on both environmental regulation stringency and country-specific endowment characteristics introduces bias into gravity equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows.
expenditure line that maintains their collinearity and the ratios of the distances between them.
Let x i,k denote the rating given by executive i to country k. Given the six thresholds, the probability that country k will receive any given rating can be written as 
